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Abstract
This paper considers a permit market with both spatial and intertemporal trading. The
intertemporal market allows firms to freely borrow or bank permits over a pre-specified
period of time. When this period is over, the permit bank has to be balanced, so firms cannot
avoid compliance just by borrowing from the future. Market power is introduced by
assuming a large dominant agent in a Stackelberg position and a large number of small firms
who are nonstrategic but forward looking. The equilibrium is characterized by for the
monopoly case and for intermediate cases.
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This article builds upon the seminal work by Hahn (1984) which points out the risk of market power and
associated economic inefﬁciencies due to the initial allocation of emission rights (opposite to the standard
textbook Coase theorem). It uses an intertemporal framework to focus on the implications of initial allo-
cations allowing for banking and borrowing of permits. As the market imperfection arises during the free
permits distribution on the basis of recent emissions1, the central part of the paper is an analytical model of
a Stackelberg game with a large potentially dominant ﬁrm and a competitive fringe. Compared to previous
literature, the contribution of this article is threefold. First, the mark-up expression developed throughout
the model generalizes in a dynamic context the analysis by Hahn (1984) on the role of initial permits allo-
cation2. Second, the results extend Liski and Montero (2005) by explicitly modelling a game structure with
hierarchical play and by taking into account the borrowing provision of emission rights. Third, compared to
Maeda (2003), the price distortion condition is obtained without loss of generality3. The remainder of the
article is organized as follows. Section 2 details the model. Section 3 derives a mark-up expression from
a benchmark. Section 4 solves the fringe problem taking the action path of the leader as given. Section 5
solves the leader’s problem. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
First, I explain the design of the cap-and-trade program. Second, I examine the industry and information
structures. Third, I deﬁne the intertemporal emissions trading constraint. Fourth, I express the Hotelling
conditions. Fifth, I explicit the properties of the abatement cost function.
2.1 Design of the Cap-and-Trade Program
TheregulatorsetsacapE onemissionsofagivenpollutantthatcorrespondstoaspeciﬁcenvironmentalgoal.
The ﬁx endowment is exogenous to the model, and may be broken down into individual permits allocation
ei mandatory for each agent i. Agents are further decomposed into two types:
1. agent {i = 1} is a large polluting agent, who is initially allocated a large number of permits;
2. agents {i = 2,...N} aggregate many small polluting agent, who are assumed to be comparatively
smaller permits-holders, and belong to the competitive fringe.
The competitive market price is determined by fringe agents’ abatement costs. The premise of the paper is
that the large agent may be able to exert market power.
2.2 Industry Structure
This partial equilibrium model features an intra-industry permit market. Market power is deﬁned by Burni-
aux (1999) as the capacity of an agent to inﬂuence the transaction price of traded permits. Thus, I do not
1See Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003) for a review concerning the use of projections, benchmarking and intensity targets.
2AnotherdifferencewithHahn’sanalyticalframeworkliesinthepresenceofalargenumberofparticipantsduetotheatomicity
of fringe agents.
3i.e. without specifying a functional form for the abatement cost function. Besides, Maeda neither considers a market power
condition within a hierarchical game structure nor examines the effects of introducing banking and borrowing on permits prices.
1address exclusionary manipulation strategies4 that occur when the dominant agent uses its market power on
the permits market to raise entry barriers or exclude agents on the output market.
2.3 Information Structure
Thelargeagentwho, duetomarketimperfectionsinducedbyinitialallocation, receivesanamountofpermits
in excess of his actual emissions needs has a clear incentive to anticipate correctly fringe agents’ behaviour.
Hence, I investigate the emergence of permits price manipulation strategies through a Stackelberg game
with hierarchical play5. I model a differential game6 played in continuous time where all players have the
possibility of inﬂuencing the rate of change of the permits bank through the choice of their current actions.
It is therefore assumed that they adopt a Markovian strategy where the state variable for the permits bank
shows up in the decision rules. The common knowledge includes the fact that all players need to comply to
the environmental constraint exogenously set by the regulator.
2.4 Intertemporal Emissions Trading
Agents may bank and borrow permits without restrictions. Let Bi(t) be the permits bank, with Bi(t) > 0 in
case of banking and Bi(t)<0 in case of borrowing. Any change in the permits bank is equal to the difference
between ei(t) and ei(t), respectively agent’s i permits allocation and his emission level at time t. Setting the
initial condition Bi(0) = 0, the banking and borrowing constraint may be written as7:
˙ Bi(t) = ei(t)−ei(t) (1)
2.5 Hotelling Conditions
Notwithstanding differences between a permit and an exhaustible resource8, it is assumed in the literature
that the Hotelling conditions for exhaustible resources must apply on a permits market. Consequently, the
terminal and exhaustion conditions are introduced.
Terminal Condition Let [0,T] be the continuous time planning horizon9. At time T, cumulated emissions











ei = E (2)
4See Misiolek and Elder (1989).
5If a pure monopoly emerges as a consequence of the distortions induced by initial allocation, a single seller may price its
ouput at a higher level than its marginal cost of production which in turns threatens the efﬁciency of the permits market.
6See Dockner et al. (2000) for an overview of differential games.
7See Rubin (1996).
8See Liski and Montero (2006) for a discussion of the differences between a tradable permits and a non-renewable resource.
9See Schennach (2000) for an alternative time setting including distinct phases of the US Acid Rain Program.
10See also Leiby and Rubin (2001).




Bi(T) = 0 (3)
Those conditions ensure that agents gradually meet their depollution objective so that the marginal cost
of depollution is equalized in present value over the time period, and the permits bank clears in the end. Note
there is typically a truncation problem at the end of the period:
• if Bi(T) > 0, surplus allowances are worthless and agents are wasting permits;
• if Bi(T) < 0, agents need to pay a penalty.
2.6 Abatement Cost Function
Let Ci(ei(t)) be the abatement cost function11 incurred by agent i in order to comply with his permits allo-
cation ei. Ci(ei(t)) is deﬁned on R → R and is of class C2[0;T]. Ci(ei(t)) is decreasing and convex in ei(t)
withC0
i(ei(t)) < 0,C00
i (ei(t)) > 0 andCi(ei(0)) = 0.
Agent’s i marginal abatement costs (MAC) are associated with a one-unit reduction from his emission
level ei at time t and are noted −C0
i(ei(t))>0. At the equilibrium of a permits market in a static framework12,




To evaluate the pure effects of over-allocating permits to the large agent with intertemporal ﬂexibility, the
dominant agent receives by assumption all the stock of permits. He sets the price at the level which corre-
sponds to the maximization of the difference between revenues from permits sales and its abatement costs.
Fringe agents behave as price takers. The mark-up expression may be derived straightforward when the large
agent directly integrates the competitive permits price into his maximization program.
3.1 Optimization program
The large agent minimizes its abatement costs with respect to total emissions and behaves as follows:

          



























11Compared to a situation where proﬁts are unconstrained, abatement costs appear in order to meet the emission cap ei. See
Leiby and Rubin (2001).
12See Hahn (1984).
3where the expression (e1(t)−e1(t)) represents the number of permits bought (> 0) or sold (< 0). Both
types of agent need to comply to the environmental constraint by adjusting their emissions level and trading
permits. In this setting, fringe agents’ emissions come from trading with the large agent. I replace the value
of Pt and (e1(t)−e1(t)) in the objective function and form the Lagrangean with e1(t) and ei(t) as control



























The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂L
∂e1(t)
= 0 ⇔ C0
1(e1(t))−λ(t) = 0 (6)
∂L
∂ei(t)






i(ei(t))−λ(t) = 0 ∀i = 2,...,N (7)
Replacing λ(t) =C0











The large agent’s MAC is equal to the competitive permits price plus an element of price distortion εi deﬁned






















∀i = 2,...,N (9)
Thus, permits price manipulation results in higher total abatement costs than under perfect competition.
Next, I detail this market power condition.
3.2 Mark-Up Expression






ei(t) = εi (e1(t)−e1(t)) (10)
Due to the convexity assumption and C0
i(ei(t)) < 0, fringe agents’ elasticity is negative, and reveals the
possibility for the leader to affect negatively fringe agents’ behaviour. The large agent’s MAC is lower than
under perfect competition. Since he enjoys a dominant position and has the ability to inﬂuence the permits
price, the large agent may be characterized overall as a net gainer and fringe agents as net losers.
4 Fringe Agents’ Reaction Function
First, I solve the fringe problem taking the action path of the leader as given. Fringe agents choose their
optimal emissions level according to the possibility to bank and borrow permits in (1).
4Agent’s i (∀i = 2,...,N) cost minimization program may be written as follows:

      










I write the corresponding current-value Hamiltonian and ﬁrst-order optimality conditions:
H(Bi(t),ei(t),λ(t),t) = {Ci(ei(t))+P(t) (ei(t)−ei(t))}−λ(t)(ei(t)−ei(t)) (11)
∂H
∂ei(t)





= 0 ⇔ ˙ Bi(t) = ei(t)−ei(t) (13)
˙ λ(t)−rλ(t) = −
∂H
∂Bi(t)
= 0, λ(T)Bi(T) = 0 (14)
It can be infered from (14) that λ(t) = λ(0)ert. The transversality condition (14) is required to meet the
exhaustion condition (3), i.e. to reﬂect the idea that the bank has no scrap value at the end of the period. I
distinguish several cases:
• if Bi(T) > 0 or Bi(T) < 0, then λ(T) = 0,λ(t) = 0,∀i = 2,...,N: when fringe agents have a net
banking or borrowing position at the end of the period, the reaction function is equal to the static
equilibrium condition (4) where fringe agents equalize their MAC with the permits price. As stated
earlier, surplus allowances are worthless and agents need to pay a penalty in case of net borrowing;
• if λ(T) > 0, then Bi(T) = 0 and λ(t) > 0,∀i = 2,...,N: when the constraint on λ is binding, this
implies a positive shadow price for units in the bank that is cleared. The reaction function is equal to
(12);
• if λ(T) < 0, then Bi(T) = 0 and λ(t) < 0,∀i = 2,...,N: this would imply a negative shadow price for
units in the bank when it is cleared. Since this result is not in accordance with the speciﬁc purpose of
a cap-and-trade program, I do not further comment this case.
I have therefore highlighted two possible forms of fringe agents’ reaction function P(t) = −C0
i(ei(t)) and
P(t) = −C0
i(ei(t))+λ(t) depending on a net banking/borrowing position or to a positive value of the co-
state variable.
5 Behaviour of the Dominant Agent
Second, I use the ﬁrst-order conditions of the fringe problem as the constraints in the leader’s problem.
I characterize the time paths for the ﬁxed horizon banking program and the mark-up expressions for the
dominant agent.
55.1 Optimization program
The large agent adjusts strategically his optimal emissions level according to its initial allocation e1 as
expressed by (2) and the banking borrowing constraint (1). The cost minimization program for agent {i=1}
is: 
        





e−rt {C1(e1(t))+Pt (e1(t)−e1(t))} dt













I now turn my attention to the ﬁrst case of fringe agents’ reaction function. Details for the second case are
provided in the Appendix.
5.2 Solution for the Leader’s Problem
Replacing Pt by (4), the large agent’s optimization program becomes:

          




























ei(t) = (N −1)ei(t) and replace the emissions
constraint (2) into the objective function:

    















˙ B1(t) = e1(t)−e1(t)
B1(0) = 0
C1(e1(0)) = 0
with ˜ E =
E
T
. I form the corresponding current-value Hamiltonian with e1(t) as a control variable, B1(t) as a
state variable, and µ(t) as a co-state variable:
H(B1(t),e1(t),µ(t),t) =C1(e1(t))−C0
i




Assuming the existence of an interior solution, necessary optimality conditions include:














 ˜ E −e1(t)
N−1





= 0 ⇔ ˙ B1(t) = e1(t)−e1(t) (17)
˙ µ(t)−rµ(t) = −
∂H
∂B1(t)
= 0, µ(T)B1(T) = 0 (18)
With reference to the transversality condition (18), I conduct the same analysis as in the previous section:
• if B1(T) > 0, then µ(T) = 0,µ(t) = 0 and Bi(T) < 0,∀i = 2,...,N: net banking by the large agent at
the end of the period is compensated by fringe agents’s net borrowing;
• if B1(T) < 0, then µ(T) = 0,µ(t) = 0 and Bi(T) > 0,∀i = 2,...,N: net borrowing by the large agent
in terminal period is compensated by fringe agents’ net banking.
Both cases of net banking B1(T) > 0 or borrowing B1(T) < 0 by the large agent in terminal period imply
µ(T) = 0 and µ(t) = 0. From eq.(16), it is possible to identify a price distortion condition analogous to the










On the left hand side of the equation, I have the large agent’s MAC. On the right hand side, I recognize
the price distortion as a function of fringe agents’ elasticity and the large agent’s permits endowment.
In either case where both agents have a net banking or borrowing position in terminal period, the large
agent is able to affect negatively fringe agent’s MAC through the number of permits he holds in excess of his
emissions. This result is similar to the benchmark case where the large agent owns all the stock of permits.
In the Appendix, I show that this solution holds for the second case of fringe agents’ reaction function.
6 Conclusions
This article contributes to the link between distributional aspects and overall efﬁciency of tradable permits
markets. First, it extends Hahn (1984)’s analysis on the distortions induced by initial allocation and market
power in a dynamic framework. Second, it builds upon Liski and Montero (2005) by modelling strategic
interactions after a Stackelberg game and providing a full characterization of the effects of unrestricted
borrowing. Third, it derives mark-up expressions without requiring a functional form for the abatement cost
function as in Maeda (2003). The emissions trading banking program with ﬁxed horizon is introduced as
an environmental regulation tool to minimize total cost for pollution abatement (Rubin (1996), Schennach
(2000)). Thus, the results shall not be misinterpreted as suggesting that allowing banking and borrowing
decreasetheefﬁencyofthepermitsmarket. Themodelcouldbeextendedbytheadoptionofanintertemporal
trading ratio speciﬁc to borrowing as discussed by Kling and Rubin (1997)14, which associated to full
banking stands out as the best conﬁguration offered by intertemporal emissions trading to smooth emissions
overtime. It may also be interesting to look at another source of heterogeneity between agents, for instance
based on their emissions reduction function15.
14The adoption of a discount rate penalizing borrowing may remove some of the perverse incentives whereby agents concentrate
emissions on early periods, which is not socially optimal.
15To obtain an idea on the relevance of the results, price distortions and efﬁciency losses based on the fringe agents’ elasticities
and the large agent’s permit endowment range from 13% to 33% in the context of the Hot Air discussion underlying the Kyoto
7Appendix
Solution for the Leader’s Problem: Second case of Fringe Agents’ Reaction Function
Replacing Pt by (12), the large agent’s optimization program becomes:

          
























The resolution method and comments are similar to the ﬁrst case:
• if B1(T) = 0, then µ(T) > 0,µ(t) > 0 and Bi(T) = 0,∀i = 2,...,N: in case both agents clear their
permits bank at the end of the period, the shadow values of a unit in the bank are positive. Both values
of µ(t) and λ(t) are known. For the large agent, the shadow value of a unit of emission in the bank
measures the marginal utility of the state at time t along the optimal trajectory. For fringe agents, λ(t)
reﬂects the highest hypothetical price at which they would be willing to pay for an additional permit
at time t.










This condition means that when both agents clear their permits bank in terminal period, the large agent
is still able to affect negatively fringe agent’s MAC. Therefore, I am able to characterize the possibility of
strategic manipulation for both forms of fringe agents’ reaction function.
Protocol. A journal of these numerical simulations based on data from Decaux and Ellerman (1998) and Löschel and Zhang
(2002) may be obtained upon request to the author.
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